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This article reviews the radical changes in voter turnout and political support levels evident at the May
2014 Local and European electoral contests in the Republic of Ireland. This analysis considers the degree
to which such trends might be reflective of the classic second-order election model. But it also considers
whether something deeper may be at play here, shaped by the dramatic political changes in Ireland
that have accompanied the period of financial austerity following the onset of the European debt
crisis in the 2007–08 period. These contests could prove to be more austerity elections rather than
classic second-order contests. Support for the more mainstream political parties (Fianna Fail, Fine
Gael and Labour) has collapsed over the past few years. This suggests that the May 2014 election
results could reflect a more radical transformation of the Irish political system, rather the temporary,
mid-term, decline in government popularity that characterises the second-order election model.
Notable shifts in support levels for government and established political parties have
characterised political life in the Republic of Ireland since the onset of the financial crisis in
2008, although these changing voting patterns are framed both in geographical and temporal
terms. It could be argued that the old certainties of voting behaviour have been eroded by the
social and economic transformations of the past few years. But has the relevance of the estab-
lished models of political science likewise been eroded, or do such models still offer useful
insights into a rapidly changing European political landscape? This account assesses the effec-
tiveness of the second-order election model in this changed political climate, with specific
reference to the May 2014 Local and European elections in the Republic of Ireland, the
“poster child for fiscal austerity”. This analysis finds that, while voter turnout and political
support trends at these contests reflect aspects of the second-order model, past and
present political trends within the Republic of Ireland suggest that the loss in government
support levels could persist until the next general election contest and add to the further frac-
turing of an already radically transformed Irish political landscape.
The concept of second-order elections was introduced by Reif and Schmitt (1980) to
frame their analysis of the first-ever series of European election contests in 1979. The
concept distinguishes between “first-order” elections, namely national parliamentary and/or
presidential elections, and other, less salient, electoral contests. By-elections, referendum elec-
tions and a host of local (or regional) contests and European elections have all been termed as
“second-order” election contests, although Schakel and Jeffery (2013) have suggested that
regional electoral contests are less likely to illustrate second-order characteristics. Voters
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believe there to be “less at stake” with these electoral contests than with national elections. Reif
and Schmitt (1980) claimed, as a result, that election campaigns tend to be less intensively con-
tested at these second-order elections, resulting in lower levels of participation and an increase
in the level of invalid ballots. In many of these electoral contests, they note, the representative
bodies being elected prove to have relatively little power and national interests and concerns
may instead tend to dominate election campaigns. Second-order elections offer voter a “low-
cost opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction” with the government (Schmitt 2005: 651), even
in the case of government supporters. Government parties will hence tend to fare poorly at
these contests, while opportunity spaces open up to allow new and smaller parties to poll
strongly. The extent of such government losses may be influenced by the timing of a
second-order election contest within a national election cycle (Marsh 1998), with government
parties faring notably better if such contests are held earlier or later during their term in office
than if these are held in the middle of their term. Reif and Schmitt’s study of the 1979 European
Elections found contrasting trends when comparing support levels across the nine states in
which these elections took place. In some states, such as the United Kingdom and Italy,
support levels for government parties were actually higher at the European contests than at
the preceding general election, but governments in other states lost support at these contests.
The most notable example here was the Fianna Fa´il government in the Republic of Ireland,
which experienced an “embarrassing setback” (Reif and Schmitt 1980: 7) at the European con-
tests of 1979, with their support level dropping by 15.9% relative to the 1977 General Election.
Reif (1984), in extending the analysis to include the 1984 European Elections, largely confirmed
the findings of this earlier study, while also arguing that second-order elections can have pol-
itical repercussions in terms of creating further turmoil between the different parties forming
coalition governments or within government parties. Reif also teased out why government
parties fare less well at these contests. He suggested that voters may be more likely to vote
tactically at first-order election contests, but with less at stake at second-order contests,
they may be more willing to vote with their hearts and opt for newer and smaller political
parties and groupings. He also suggests that government support levels at such second-
order contests will also be shaped by the strength of the domestic economy, as well as also
being influenced by domestic and international political crises. Marsh (1998)’s study of the con-
tests between 1979 and 1994 also confirmed key aspects of the second-order election model.
However, he argued that second-order contests can also act as “pointers to subsequent
general elections” (ibid.: 606), noting that, in some instances, government support levels
may not recover after a poor performance in a second-order elections. Schmitt (2005)’s
study of the 2004 European Elections largely confirmed the findings of the earlier studies.
Participation levels were generally found to be notably lower than those for the preceding
first-order (general) election contest, with the exceptions of the two states that have compul-
sory voting rules, Belgium and Luxembourg. (Voter turnout levels in the Republic of Ireland
were only a few percentage points lower than the voter turnout levels for the preceding
general election in 2002, however). Schmitt suggested that low participation levels may, in
some instances, be related to levels of scepticism with the European Union (EU), although
no general trend was established. With rare exceptions (Spain and Slovakia), government
parties were found to lose support at the contests relative to the preceding general election,
with the greatest losses being experienced in countries where European Elections were held in
the middle of that government’s term in office.
So does the second-order election paradigm still hold in the changed political landscape
carved out by the austerity policies of the European debt crisis, or does this model have no
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further resonance given the radically changed socio-economic and political climate? This will
be the question that frames this analysis of the 2014 Local and European Elections in the
Republic of Ireland. But to offer further context, it is useful here to review the turnout and gov-
ernment support trends at the 2014 European Elections contest across all 28 Member States.
Voter turnout levels again fell notably relative to those of the preceding first-order (general)
election contests in most of the EU Member States, with turnout levels falling by just under
25% on average, albeit with some notable exceptions. The elections in Lithuania took place
on the same day as the second round of voting in a presidential election contest, while
there was again little change in turnout levels in the states that have compulsory voting
laws, namely Luxembourg and Belgium. The level of turnout decline tended to be less
notable in those states that held other types of election contests on the same day as the Euro-
pean elections, with Belgium and Greece proving to be the most notable examples here but
with a similar trend also being evidenced, albeit to a lesser degree, in the Republic of
Ireland. At the other extreme, turnout fell by much higher levels in a number of the newer,
post-communist, member states in the most eastern regions of the Union, including the
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia and Hungary, as well as Cyprus. A number of more
western states, namely France, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom,
also experienced levels of turnout decline of close to, or greater than, 30% relative to those
recorded at the preceding first-order contests. These states tended also to see significant
gains in support and representation levels for a number of populist, mainly right-wing and
anti-EU political parties at these contests, such as the Front National, Danish People’s Party,
Swedish Democrats and the United Kingdom Independence Party. (The Dutch Party for
Freedom did lose support relative to their performance at the 2009 European Elections,
although the party fared better at the 2014 contest than they had at the preceding general
election contest.) It could be argued that the lower voter turnout levels in these states
acted as a means of allowing these parties, whose supporters may have been relatively
more likely to turn out to vote, to poll strongly at these contests. By contrast, it could also
be argued that the rising support levels for these populist right-wing parties may not solely
reflect the political trends expected within the second-order election model, but may
instead be a function of the changing political landscape of austerity Europe. This latter
hypothesis cannot, of course, be verified until the next set of first-order, or general, elections
have taken place in these states.
The evidence from the May 2014 contests across the EU generally reflects different
aspects of the second-order election model, while also illustrating that the extent of govern-
ment support losses was shaped by the period within the national electoral cycle that such
contests took place in. In all, government party support levels across the 28 EU member
states fell by an average of just over 10% relative to the preceding first-order election contests.
There were a number of states that eschewed this trend. Belgium fits into this category almost
by default, given that federal elections in that state were held on the same date as the Euro-
pean Elections contest, with a new electoral law dictating that the dates of these contests will
coincide in the future, commencing with the 2014 contests. The same applies in the case of
Lithuania, given that the second round of voting in that state’s presidential election coincided
with the European vote. (That said, the example of the 1989 elections in the Republic of Ireland,
as noted below, shows that government parties need not always win similar levels of support
at second-order contests that are being held on the same day as a general election.) Other
states that fell into this category included those that held their most recent general election
contests relatively close to the European contests, namely Germany, Austria, Italy, Malta and
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Bulgaria (with all these states holding general elections in 2013), or states, such as Hungary,
that had very low turnout levels for these contests. Finland is the only state in this group
that does not fit neatly into either of these two categories, with the relatively high support
level for government parties in this case reflecting the large number of parties that currently
form Finland’s governing coalition. By contrast, the extent of government party losses out-
stripped the European average in a number of states, including the Netherlands (30.0%), the
United Kingdom (29.1%), the Republic of Ireland (27.9%) and France (27.0%). While the politics
of austerity figures prominently in each of these cases, the Irish context is different from that of
the other states listed here, given that rising support levels for right-wing populist parties did
not act to inflate the extent of government losses in the Irish case.
The European Elections vote took place simultaneously with local election contests in
the Republic of Ireland, a pattern that has been in place since 1999 (although the first-ever
European contests also took place on the same day as local election contests in 1979). The
nature of these contests varies notably from each other in the Irish context, however. European
election contests in the Republic of Ireland tend to favour high-profile personalities and, as
such, these are similar in scope to Irish presidential election contests. Local elections, by con-
trast, favour candidates with strong roots in their local areas who have proven records of
constituency service and community activism. With the EU having emerged as “an important
co-legislator, on a par with national legislatures” over the past number of decades (Schmitt
2005: 653), the European level is substantially more important in terms of setting the Irish
state’s policy agenda in contrast with the relatively low levels of power being attributed to
the local level. However, studies of voting trends in the Republic of Ireland suggest that the
European contests are more second order in nature than local elections are. As is evident
from Figure 1, voter turnout levels at European contests in the state have tended to be
higher when these are held simultaneously with local election contests (or general elections),
with the lowest ever turnout levels being recorded on the two occasions that the European
FIGURE 1
Voter turnout levels (%) at European Election contests in the Republic of Ireland, 1979–2014
Notes: The 1989 contest was held on the same day as a general election. All the other
contests were held on the same day as local election contests, with the exceptions of
1984 and 1994.
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elections were effectively stand-alone contests. The impact that the local election contests have
on pushing up European contest turnout levels is also evident when invalid vote trends for these
two contests are contrasted. The number of invalid votes cast at the European contest (45,424, or
2.7% of all votes cast) across the state was more than twice as large as the number cast at the
local election contests (22,216, or 1.3%), suggesting that at least somemembers of the electorate
placed less weight on the European contest when casting their ballots. Invalid vote levels at the
European contest remained relatively low (1.8%) in the Dublin constituency, but these levels
spiked in the other two, more rural, constituencies of Midlands–North-West (2.6%) and South
(3.2%). By contrast, there were no significant spatial differences in invalid vote levels at the
local elections between Dublin (1.4%) and the Midlands–North-West (1.2%) and South (1.3%)
constituencies. The contrasting invalid vote levels for the local and European contests in the
more rural South and Midlands–North-West constituencies suggest that the local election
contests held greater levels of salience for voters in these more rural regions than the European
contests did, with this trend not being as readily apparent in Dublin. This reflects the contrasting
turnout geographies that exist for different types of electoral contests in the Republic of Ireland.
Turnout levels are generally higher in rural Ireland for general and local election contests, but
tend to be higher in urban areas (and particularly in middle-class urban areas) for referendum
elections. Politics focused around local personalities and local political issues tend to excite
rural (and also working-class urban) voters to a greater extent than the issue-based politics
that characterise referendum votes, but referendum contests tend to be more attractive to
middle-class urban voters (Kavanagh 2002).
The relative propensity of rural and urban working-class voters towards higher partici-
pation levels at local election contests has seen higher turnout levels being recorded in
certain parts of the state at local elections than at first-order (general) election contests in
the past, as tantamount to Horiuchi’s (2005) turnout twist concept. A contrast of turnout
levels between the 2002 General Election and 2004 Local Elections, for instance, found clusters
of higher local election turnout in a number of economically peripheral areas, including a
number of areas in the west of the state and also a number of socially marginalised areas in
Dublin (Figure 2). Perceptions of being far distant from the capital, whether it be in geographi-
cal or social terms, led voters in these areas to place more faith in local politics and their local
political representatives, irrespective of the fact that little real power is invested at the local
level in Ireland. At a more localised level, the presence in a local elections race of one, or
more, candidates from a specific area also had the effect of pushing up turnout levels at
those contests in that area, over and above the levels recorded at the preceding general elec-
tion contest.
The extent of this turnout twist phenomenon is unlikely to have been as widespread at
the 2014 contest, however. The turnout difference at the national level between the preceding
general election contest (69.9%) in 2011 and the local election contest (51.6%) of 2014 was
much wider than that evidenced at the previous two local election contests. This could
suggest—at least on the basis of voter turnout levels—that local election contests are becom-
ing decidedly more second order in nature in the Republic of Ireland. But a claim by Reif and
Schmitt (1980: 13) that second-order election turnouts will be adversely effected if constituen-
cies are “new and unfamiliar” and “bear little meaning” for electorates, who cannot identify
with such “artificial” territorial entities, has resonance here. Major changes were made both
to local and European election boundaries ahead of the May 2014 contests, with the overall
size of these constituencies being dramatically increased in a number of cases but particularly
in the more rural areas. Indeed, Midlands–North-West, the largest of the European
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constituencies, covered a territory that was larger than the areas of five EU states; Belgium, Slo-
venia, Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg. The resultant increase in the distances—in geographical
terms, at least—between voters and their most local candidates at the May 2014 contests may
have had a depressing impact on turnout propensity, given the role that local candidates play
in mobilising higher turnout levels at these contests (Kavanagh 2002).
FIGURE 2
Contrasts between turnout levels at the 2002 General Election and the 2004 Local and
European Elections at the electoral division level in the Republic of Ireland
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Studies of voter turnout levels in the Republic of Ireland offer strong evidence that local,
European, referendum and by-election contests are second order in nature, while suggesting
that some electoral contests are more second order in nature than others. These also show that
place matters in relation to turnout propensity at second-order election contests, with signifi-
cant urban–rural variations existing in relation to these. Such trends are also evident in relation
to political support levels. Commencing with the “embarrassing setback” for the Fianna Fa´il
government at the very first European election contest in 1979 (Reif and Schmitt 1980: 7),
Irish voters have tended to use European election contests as a means of exacting retribution
on government parties, a trend that has also been evident with other types of second-order
election contests, including local elections (Table 1). Referendum contests, even though politi-
cal parties do not of course contest these, also fit into this category as voters may often choose
to vote against referendum proposals as much on the basis of anti-government sentiment as
their opposition to the actual referendum proposals. The problems faced by government
parties at second-order contests are readily evident in the fact that no government party suc-
ceeded in winning any of the 21 Da´il by-election contests held between 1983 and 2010.
However, the present government parties have succeeded in winning three of the six by-elec-
tion contests held since the 2011 General Election.
As Table 1 shows, government parties have consistently lost support at the next Euro-
pean and local election contests held after a government was elected into power, although
the extent of such losses has varied depending on economic conditions within the state.
The period of economic recession extending from the mid-to-late 1970s up to the early
TABLE 1
Government party performances at second-order election contests (European and local
elections) as contrasted with those parties’ performances at general election (GE) when elected
into power and at general election at end of term in office
Government Preceding GE European Local Following GE
Fianna Fa´il, 1977–81 50.6 (Jun 77) 34.7 (Jun 79) 39.1 (Jun 79) 45.3 (Jun 81)
Fine Gael-Labour,
1981–82
46.4 (Jun 81) – – 46.2 (Feb 82)
Fianna Fa´il, 1982 47.0 (Feb 82) – – 45.2 (Nov 82)
Fine Gael-Labour,
1982–87
48.6 (Nov 82) 40.5 (Jun 84) 37.6 (Jun 85) 33.5 (Feb 87)
Fianna Fa´il, 1987–89 44.1 (Feb 87) 31.5 (Jun 89) – 44.1 (Jun 89)
Fianna Fa´il-Progressive
Democrats, 1989–92
49.6 (Jun 89) – 43.0 (Jun 91) 43.8 (Nov 92)
Fianna Fa´il-Labour,
1992–94a
58.4 (Nov 92) 46.0 (Jun 94) – 50.3 (Jun 97)
Fine Gael-Labour-
Democratic Left,
1994a–97
46.6 (Nov 92) – – 41.5 (Jun 97)
Fianna Fa´il-Progressive
Democrats, 1997–2002
44.5 (Jun 97) 38.6 (Jun 99) 41.7 (Jun 99) 45.5 (May 02)
Fianna Fa´il-Progressive
Democrats, 2002–07
45.5 (May 02) 29.5 (Jun 04) 35.6 (Jun 04) 44.3 (Jun 07)
Fianna Fa´il-Green Party-
Progressive
Democratsb, 2007–11
47.0 (Jun 07) 26.0 (Jun 09) 27.7 (Jun 09) 19.2 (Feb 11)
aA change of government occurred in December 1994, without a general election taking place.
bThe Progressive Democrats initially formed part of the government who were elected into
power in June 2007, but the party voted to disband itself in November 2008.
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1990s saw significant falls in government support being recorded at such second-order con-
tests, but the extent of such losses was curtailed by the improvement in economic conditions
in the late 1990s as evidenced in a relatively strong government performance at the 1999 local
and European elections. A mini-recession following the 2002 General Election and another pro-
longed period of economic recession, commencing in 2008, however, saw a return to the
pattern of significant government losses at mid-term local and European election contests
but with the size of these losses proving to be even larger than they were in the 1980s and
early 1990s. Fianna Fa´il, the party whose economic policies were blamed for the economic
crisis, lost a significant level of support at the 2009 contest, with a similar fate also befalling
their junior coalition partners, the Green Party. But the extent of the Fianna Fa´il and Green
Party losses in 2009 paled in comparison with those of the government parties, Fine Gael
and Labour, at the 2014 elections (Table 2).
It is interesting to note that on the one occasion when a second-order election contest
took place on the same day as a general election, namely the electoral contests of June 1989,
the extent of government party (Fianna Fa´il) losses at the European elections contest far out-
stripped that party’s losses in the general election. This also mirrors the general trend in
support patterns at the local and European election contests, with government party
support levels tending to be usually higher at local elections than at European contests,
even if these contests are held on the same day. Overall, the trend set here is one of govern-
ment party losses at European contests relative to their performances at preceding general
elections, with a similar trend applying in the case of local election contests over this
period, but this is only part of the story.
Studies of government party performances at the next general election contests held
after these (usually) mid-term second-order elections help determine whether the levels of
anti-government sentiment at these contests proved to be temporary in nature, or not. Did
TABLE 2
Political party/grouping support levels in the Republic of Ireland at 2011 General Election and
2014 Local and European election contests
Party/grouping
General Election
2011 (%)
Local Elections
2014 (%)
European Elections
2014 (%)
Fine Gael 36.1 24.0 22.3
Labour Party 19.4 7.2 5.3
Government Parties
(combined)
55.5 31.2 27.6
Fianna Fa´il 17.4 25.3 22.3
Sinn Fe´in 9.9 15.3 19.5
The Green Party 1.8 1.6 4.9
People Before Profit Alliance 1.0 1.7 1.4
Anti-Austerity Alliance/
Socialist Party
1.2 1.2 1.8
United Left – 0.3 –
Workers Party 0.1 0.2 –
Direct Democracy Ireland – 0.2 1.5
E´irı´gı´ – 0.2 –
Fı´s Nua – 0.1 0.3
Workers and Unemployed
Action Group
0.4 0.1 –
Independents and Others 12.7 22.5 20.7
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government party supporters use these to give their parties a “bloody nose” before returning
to normal patterns of voting behaviour at the next general election, or were support levels at
the contests instead symptomatic of longer term trend in which government support losses
continued into the following general election? The evidence offered by Tables 1 and 2 gener-
ally tends to support the latter hypothesis. In most cases, while a recovery in government
support levels did occur between these second-order election contests and the subsequent
general elections, the extent of this recovery did not compensate for the level of losses experi-
enced at the earlier second-order contests, with the “Celtic Tiger” contests of 2002 and 2007
marking the notable exceptions to this trend. In some cases, government support levels con-
tinued to fall after these contests, as evidenced with the 1987 and 2011 elections.
The extent of government party support losses since the onset of the European debt
crisis in 2008 has dwarfed that of the earlier periods, including the last major economic reces-
sion of the 1980s. The fall in support for Fianna Fa´il and its junior coalition partner, the Green
Party, at the 2009 Local and European elections (Table 1) was unprecedented in terms of its
scope at that point in time. However, the ongoing economic woes, further exacerbated by
the need for the state to be “bailed out” in late 2010 by a troika involving the International
Monetary Fund, EU and European Central Bank, saw support levels for these government
parties plummet further at the 2011 General Election (Table 1). Fianna Fa´il had won 78 seats
(out of 166 seats in Da´il E´ireann, the Irish parliament) at the 2007 election with 6 seats
being won by the Green Party, but Fianna Fa´il won just 20 seats at the 2011 election while
the Greens were left with no representation. Most of these losses translated in gains for the
main opposition parties, Fine Gael and Labour, with these parties forming a government
with a majority of unprecedented scope—the two parties would account for 68.1% of all
seats (113 seats) in Da´il E´ireann. However, despite a number of electoral successes in a
short-lived honeymoon period at the start of their term in office (Labour won the 2011 Presi-
dential Election and a Da´il by-election in the Dublin West constituency eight months after the
general election was held), opinion poll trends showed that these parties soon started to lose
support in the wake of the government’s first austerity budget in the autumn of 2011. Most of
the focus was on the Labour Party’s poll ratings with these falling to levels of 6% or 7% by 2013
(Figure 3); support levels that would leave the party with little or no representation in Da´il
E´ireann if they were to be replicated at a general election contest (Kavanagh 2013). Fine
Gael losses initially were not as dramatic, but a number of political controversies in the first
few months of 2014 saw a more significant reversal in that party’s fortunes.
The 2014 Local and European Elections, coming well past the midpoint in the govern-
ment’s term in office, were always going to pose a major electoral test, especially with two
Da´il by-elections (in Dublin West and Longford–Westmeath) also being held on the same
day. Fine Gael and Labour fared poorly at these elections, with their combined loss of
support relative to the 2011 election amounting to 24.3% at the local elections and 27.9%
at the European contests. As usually is the case with Irish electoral contests, geography mat-
tered in relation to these voting trends, with the extent of government party losses varying
across the state. The most dramatic losses, relative to the 2011 elections, were experienced
in the Dublin region, with combined government party losses of 29.5% at the local elections
and 36.3% at the European elections. The extent of government losses in the other, more
rural, regions (or European constituencies) was, by contrast, less pronounced. Combined gov-
ernment party losses of 18.7% at the local elections and 26.7% at the European elections were
evident in the Midlands–North-West region, while in the South region, there were combined
government party losses of 22.8% at the local elections and 24.1% at the European contest.
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Fine Gael lost over 100 seats at the 2014 Local Elections, while Labour lost over 60% of
their council seats in these contests. Labour also lost all of the three seats that they had won at
the 2009 European Elections. The extent of these Labour Party losses resulted in the resigna-
tion of their party leader, Eamon Gilmore, days after these contests had taken place. However,
the vagaries of the Irish Proportional Representation by Single Transferable Vote electoral
system, wedded to the radical changes made to the European Parliament constituency bound-
aries, helped Fine Gael to retain all of their four European Parliament seats, even though the
overall number of Ireland’s European Parliament seats had been reduced by one. Ironically,
Fine Gael won marginally fewer votes than Fianna Fa´il did at the European elections
(Table 2), but the latter party only won one seat. Fianna Fa´il and the Green Party did reclaim
some of the ground lost by them during their period in government between 2007 and 2011,
however. Fianna Fa´il reclaimed their position as the state’s largest political party, at least at the
local authority level, while the Green Party regained support and representation levels—
mainly in their main, middle-class Dublin, support base. The Green Party increased their
number of council seats from 3 to 13 and fell little more than a thousand votes short of
winning a European Parliament seat in the Dublin constituency. While these parties’ fortunes
have not recovered to the levels of support enjoyed by them at the 2007 General Election, the
evidence of the 2014 contests is that the catastrophic losses experienced at the 2009 and 2011
elections have not proven to be terminal in nature.
While the parties that comprised the previous government saw improved fortunes at the
2014 elections, the largest gains were made by independent candidates and a number of left-
leaning political parties and groupings. Independents generally fare well at local election
FIGURE 3
Changing support patterns for Irish political parties in Irish Times-Ipsos MRBI opinion polls
in the period following the 2011 General Election
Source: Collins (2015).
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contests in the Republic of Ireland, in a similar vein to the association observed in the literature
between the second-order model and stronger electoral performances for smaller parties. The
Independents grouping fared especially well in the 2014 contest, accounting for more than
one-fifth of all the valid votes cast at these. Non-party fortunes at European contests are a
direct function of the profile of the independent candidates contesting these, with very
high support levels being recorded in 2014 in the Midlands–North-West constituency as
this featured a number of high-profile independents, who accounted for two of the four
seats there. While European issues rarely impact on voting at European elections in the Repub-
lic of Ireland, with national issues usually having more influence on these, the election of non-
party candidate, Luke Ming Flanagan, in Midlands–North-West offered a rare exception to this
trend. His success was, in part, due to strong support in this region for his stance opposing the
banning of turf-cutting in certain bogland areas, with this ban having arisen from the
implementation of the EU’s Habitats Directive.
A number of smaller left-wing parties or groupings, such as the People Before Profit
Alliance and the Anti-Austerity Alliance, made gains at more localised levels in urban areas,
but particularly in the Dublin region. The most significant gains at the 2014 elections,
however, fell to Sinn Fe´in, a nationalist and left-leaning party whose electoral performances
in the Republic of Ireland had been overshadowed by their electoral strength in Northern
Ireland over previous decades. The party has, however, been consistently building up its
support base in the Republic of Ireland since the late 1990s, albeit with a temporary decline
in fortunes (particularly in the Dublin region) over the 2007–09 period. A win for Pearse
Doherty at the 2010 Donegal South-West Da´il by-election, held a few months before the
2011 General Election, heralded a renewed period of growth for Sinn Fe´in and the party
gained 10 seats at that election. Opinion poll figures since the 2011 contest have pointed
towards a consistent trend of increased Sinn Fe´in support levels (Kavanagh 2013; Loscher
2015), almost to the same extent as the decline in Labour Party fortunes since entering govern-
ment in 2011. However, while polls in early 2014 had party support levels sitting consistently
around the 20% level, Sinn Fe´in’s share of vote at the local elections (Figure 3) fell somewhat
short of this, in part due to the lower turnout propensity of the party’s younger and more
working-class support bases. The party’s weaker levels of local organisation may have also
placed it at a disadvantage against Fianna Fa´il and Fine Gael in these contests, particularly
in areas where Sinn Fe´in did not have an established base of support. However, Sinn Fe´in
did succeed in more than trebling their number of council seats at these elections, with an
especially strong performance in Dublin (19.0%) and particularly in the more working-class
areas within that city (Kavanagh 2015). Sinn Fe´in’s European election performance was even
more impressive. The party’s approach of selecting presidential-style candidates far in
advance of the May 2014 elections paid dividends and they won seats in each of the three
European Parliament constituencies. As the largest party in the state not to have been in gov-
ernment since the onset of the economic crisis, Sinn Fe´in is well placed to further benefit from
growing anti-government and anti-politics sentiment in the Republic of Ireland, as confirmed
by the series of opinion polls carried out following the May 2014 elections (Figure 3).
Characteristics of the second-order election model were evident again across the Euro-
pean continent at the May 2014 elections. Trends that have characterised European politics
during the period of austerity since the onset of the debt crisis in 2008 once again came to
the fore. But European-level trends always express themselves differently in different contexts
and spaces and this is very much the case with Ireland. So were the May 2014 elections symp-
tomatic of second-order voting behaviour, or did these mark just another phase in a process of
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growing anti-government sentiment that would mark these contests as examples of austerity
voting? Voter turnout and party support trends at the May 2014 elections would appear to be
reflective of the second-order election model, with a notable drop in voter turnout and gov-
ernment support levels relative to those of the 2011 General Election. But trends evident
when local and European contests were held during periods of economic recession (1985,
2009) in the past suggest that anti-government sentiment need not always spike at such con-
tests and can instead develop further into even greater losses at the next general election
contest. Governments have proven to be especially endangered species in Ireland and since
the 1969 election most Irish governments have lost notable levels of support at subsequent
general election contests, with the exception of the Celtic Tiger period of economic growth
in the early 2000s. Hence, government party support losses at these mid-term contests
might not necessarily reflect second-order voting trends, but might instead be merely a
staging point in terms of an overall trend of more widespread government losses, culminating
in especially low levels of support at a subsequent general election.
A study of opinion poll trends in the wake of the May 2014 elections would suggest the
latter scenario, as support levels for the government parties dropped further in the latter part
of 2014, culminating in a series of opinion polls in December 2014 that had combined govern-
ment party support at its lowest level, by far, since Fine Gael and Labour entered office in
March 2011 (Figure 3). This was strongly linked to controversies surrounding the proposed
introduction of water charges, with the mushrooming of public protests on this issue in late
2014 acting to further bolster the electoral prospects of Sinn Fe´in, but also the Independents
and Others grouping, as was evident at two Da´il by-elections in Roscommon–South Leitrim
and Dublin South-West. While government losses are the norm at such mid-term by-elections,
the combined loss in Fine Gael and Labour support levels at the Dublin South-West contest
(down 46.8% on the 2011 election) was the largest government loss at a Da´il by-election in
the history of the state. However, a series of polls in March 2015 pointed towards some recov-
ery for the government parties. A breakdown of the figures for the Irish Times-Ipsos MRBI poll of
26 March 2015 (Loscher 2015) points to a geographical and social dimension to these
improved government support levels, with combined Fine Gael–Labour levels standing at
50% among the upper-/middle-class groups and at 23% among the working-class groups
(Collins 2015). The suggestion is that evidence of economic recovery is acting to bolster gov-
ernment support levels somewhat, especially as the next general election (scheduled to be
held at any stage up to April 2016) draws closer, but there is a notable class and geographical
basis to this government recovery. If trends continue—and these are as much dependent on
the international economic environment as on Irish policy initiatives—then its strong position
among the middle-class electorate means that Fine Gael could well recover its support to a
sufficient level to allow it to lead the next government. However, given the simmering anti-aus-
terity sentiment in working-class urban areas, and the continued strength of Sinn Fe´in and
other left-wing groupings in such areas, the potential for a recovery in Labour Party support
levels seems less certain. It could well be the case that the May 2014 elections amounted to
classic second-order contests in certain parts of the state, while marking another phase in
the development of anti-austerity style voting in the more working-class urban environments.
Whether amounting to second-order or austerity voting, it can be argued that the May
2014 elections mark yet another phase in the movement of Irish politics more towards the
class-cleavage politics of continental Europe. Admittedly, this comes at a point in time when
there is much focus on the growing levels of support enjoyed by populist parties on the
extreme right of the political spectrum in core EU states such as France, Denmark and the
250 ADRIAN P. KAVANAGH
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ay
no
oth
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
7:0
2 0
2 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
United Kingdom. In Ireland, by contrast, left-leaning parties and groupings—most notably Sinn
Fe´in—have been the main beneficiaries of the dramatic changes sweeping across the Irish pol-
itical landscape since 2008. This does, however, bring Irish politics into line with the political
changes impacting on the other peripheral EU states (Kavanagh 2015), which have resulted
in significant gains at recent elections for left-wing, or anti-austerity, groupings such as the
Five Star Movement in Italy, Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece. Ultimately, while the
degree of political change in Ireland, as in Greece (Mavris 2012), has outstripped much of
the rest of Europe during the period of economic austerity, the result of this change may be
to produce an Irish political system that is no longer dominated by the right-of-centre
parties of Fianna Fa´il and Fine Gael. A new model may be emerging, which is more in line
with the classic right wing–left wing cleavages associated with the European political
model and which reflects the political trends in the other peripheral European states.
Whether these purely reflected a new austerity voting paradigm (as suggested by political
trends in late 2014) or whether these were mainly second-order in nature (as suggested by
the opinion polls of March 2015), the May 2014 elections have shown that the old certainties
of Irish politics are being fast eroded. The new political landscape that is emerging is highly
fractured, uncertain and rapidly changing. With the number of seats in Da´il E´ireann to be
reduced at the next general election (Kavanagh 2014), the potential for significant seat
losses among the government parties is further exacerbated, even if, in keeping with the
second-order election model, these parties do recover some support levels before the next
general election. The extent of such losses may well force Fianna Fa´il and Fine Gael into a
grand coalition after the next election for the first time in the history of those parties, which
would effectively mark the end of the Civil War politics cleavage that has dominated Irish
politics since the founding of the state. This could make for even further, dramatic, changes
in subsequent years, should unfavourable economic conditions persist well into the present
decade.
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